Tag: underbanked

There are many ways to promote a more equitable society - including financial inclusion or reducing the racial wealth gap for underserved communities.

The rapid rate at which fintech challengers are becoming established, is in turn, allowing for greater consumer awareness and adoption of fintech platforms.

Experian sat down with Shawn Hanson, CEO at Marine Credit Union to get his perspective and insights about growth, risk and the underserved.

The dramatic transformation of the financial services industry requires new advances and innovation in credit strategies to respond to the growing number of underbanked customers who need to be served. The underbanked, or unbanked, market now represents nearly 64 million U.S. consumers who have limited or no traditional credit history. Take a quiz now to test your knowledge of America's underbanked. Source: Experian News, May 2012

By: Kari Michel In January, Experian announced the inclusion of positive rental data from its RentBureau division into the traditional credit file. This is great news for an estimated 50 million underbanked consumers - everyone from college students and recent graduates to immigrants - to build credit with continuous on-time rental payments. With approximately 1/3 of Americans renting, lenders who are using VantageScore will benefit from the inclusion of RentBureau data into the score calculation.  VantageScore from Experian is able to both enhance its predictive ability for those that can already be scored as well as provide scores for those that previously could not be scored. With the inclusion of RentBureau data, 34% of thin file consumers increased their score from an ‘F’ (VantageScore 501 – 599) to a ‘D’ (VantageScore 600 – 699). For those consumers that did not have a prior credit history, 70% of them were able to be scored after the inclusion of RentBureau data into the credit repository.  As a result, fewer consumers will get a “no hit” returned to lenders during a credit inquiry. Lenders will now have a comprehensive understanding of a consumer’s total monthly obligations to assist with offering credit to emerging consumers.

As our newly elected officials begin to evaluate opportunities to drive economic growth in 2011, it seems to me that the role of lenders in motivating consumer activity will continue to be high on the list of both priorities and actions that will effectively move the needle of economic expansion. From where I sit, there are a number of consumer segments that each hold the potential to make a significant impact in this economy. For instance, renters with spotless credit, but have not been able or confident enough to purchase a home, could move into the real estate market, spurring growth and housing activity. Another group, and one I am specifically interested in discussing, are the so called ‘fallen angels’ - borrowers who previously had pristine track records, but have recently performed poorly enough to fall from the top tiers of consumer risk segments. I think the interesting quality of ‘fallen angels’ is not that they don’t possess the motivation needed to push economic growth, but rather the supply and opportunity for them to act does not exist. Lenders, through the use of risk scores and scoring models, have not yet determined how to easily identify the ‘fallen angel’ amongst the pool of higher-risk borrowers whose score tiers they now inhabit. This is a problem that can be solved though – through the use of credit attributes and analytic solutions, lenders can uncover these up-side segments within pools of potential borrowers – and many lenders are employing these assets today in their efforts to drive growth. I believe that as tools to identify and lend to untapped segments such as the ‘fallen angels’ develop, these consumers will inevitably turn out to be key contributors to any form of economic recovery.  

By: Kari Michel Credit quality deteriorated across the credit spectrum during the recession that began in December, 2007. As the recession winds down, lenders must start strategically assessing credit risk and target creditworthy consumer segments for lending opportunities, while avoiding those segments where consumer credit quality could continue to slip. Studies and analyses by VantageScore® Solutions, LLC demonstrate that there are more than 60 million creditworthy borrowers in the United States - 7 million of whom cannot be identified using standard scoring models. Leveraging methods using the VantageScore® credit score in conjunction with consumer credit behaviors can effectively identify profitable opportunities and segments that require increased risk mitigation thus optimizing decisions. VantageScore Solutions examined how consumers credit scores changed over a 12 month period.  The study focused on three areas of consumer behavior: Stable:  consumers that stay within the same credit tier for one year Improving:  consumers that move to a higher credit tier in any quarter and remain at a high credit tier for the remainder of the timeframe Deteriorating: consumers that move to a lower credit tier in any quarter and remain at a lower credit tier for the remainder of the timeframe Through a segmentation approach, using the three credit behaviors above and credit quality tiers, emerges a clearer picture into profitable segments for acquisitions and existing account management strategies. Download the white paper, “Finding creditworthy consumers in a changing economic climate”, for more information on finding creditworthy consumers from VantageScore Solutions. Lenders can use a similar segmentation analysis on their own population to identify pockets of opportunity to move beyond recession-based management strategies and intelligently re-enter into the world of originations and maximize portfolio profitability.

In a continuation of my previous entry, I’d like to take the concept of the first-mover and specifically discuss the relevance of this to the current bank card market. Here are some statistics to set the stage: • Q2 2009 bankcard origination levels are now at 54 percent of Q2 2008 levels • In Q2 2009, bankcard originations for subprime and deep-subprime were down 63 percent from Q2 2008 • New average limits for bank cards are down 19 percent in Q2 2009 from peak in Q3 2008 • Total unused limits continued to decline in Q3 2009, decreasing by  $100 billion in Q3 2009 Clearly, the bank card market is experiencing a decline in credit supply, along with deterioration of credit performance and problematic delinquency trends, and yet in order to grow, lenders are currently determining the timing and manner in which to increase their presence in this market. In the following points, I’ll review just a few of the opportunities and risks inherent in each area that could dictate how this occurs. Lender chooses to be a first-mover: • Mining for gold – lenders currently have an opportunity to identify long-term profitable segments within larger segments of underserved consumers. Credit score trends show a number of lower-risk consumers falling to lower score tiers, and within this segment, there will be consumers who represent highly profitable relationships. Early movers have the opportunity to access these consumers with unrealized creditworthiness at their most receptive moment, and thus have the ability to achieve extraordinary profits in underserved segments. • Low acquisition costs – The lack of new credit flowing into the market would indicate a lack of competitiveness in the bank card acquisitions space. As such, a first-mover would likely incur lower acquisitions costs as consumers have fewer options and alternatives to consider. • Adverse selection - Given the high utilization rates of many consumers, lenders could face an abnormally high adverse selection issue, where a large number of the most risky consumers are likely to accept offers to access much needed credit – creating risk management issues. • Consumer loyalty – Whether through switching costs or loyalty incentives, first-movers have an opportunity to achieve retention benefits from the development of new client relationships in a vacant competitive space. Lender chooses to be a secondary or late-mover: • Reduced risk by allowing first-mover to experience growing pains before entry. The implementation of new acquisitions and risk-based pricing management techniques with new bank card legislation will not be perfected immediately. Second-movers will be able to read and react to the responses to first movers’ strategies (measuring delinquency levels in new subprime segments) and refine their pricing and policy approaches. • One of the most common first-mover advantages is the presence of switching costs by the customer. With minimal switching costs in place in the bank card industry, the ability for second-movers to deal with an incumbent is not one where switching costs are significant issues – second-movers would be able to steal market share with relative ease. • Cherry-picked opportunities – as noted above, many previously attractive consumers will have been engaged by the first-mover, challenging the second-mover to find remaining attractive segments within the market. For instance, economic deterioration has resulted in short-term joblessness for some consumers who might be strong credit risks, given the return of capacity to repay. Once these consumers are mined by the first-mover, the second-mover will likely incur greater costs to acquire these clients. Whether lenders choose to be first to market, or follow as a second-mover, there are profitable opportunities and risk management challenges associated with each strategy.  Academics and bloggers continue to debate the merits of each, (1)  but it is the ultimately lenders of today that will provide the proof.   [1] http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/38/cdu.html  

I’ve recently been hearing a lot about how bankcard lenders are reacting to changes in legislation, and recent statistics clearly show that lenders have reduced bankcard acquisitions as they retune acquisition and account management strategies for their bankcard portfolios. At this point, there appears to be a wide-scale reset of how lenders approach the market, and one of the main questions that needs to be answered pertains to market-entry timing: Should a lender be the first to re-enter the market in a significant manner, or is it better to wait, and see how things develop before executing new credit strategies? I will dedicate my next two blogs to defining these approaches and discussing them with regard to the current bankcard market. Based on common academic frameworks, today’s lenders have the option of choosing one of the following two routes: becoming a first-mover, or choosing to take the role of a secondary or late mover. Each of these roles possess certain advantages and also corresponding risks that will dictate their strategic choices: The first-mover advantage is defined as “A sometimes insurmountable advantage gained by the first significant company to move into a new market.” (1)  Although often confused with being the first-to-market, first-mover advantage is more commonly considered for firms that first substantially enter the market. The belief is that the first mover stands to gain competitive advantages through technology, economies of scale and other avenues that result from this entry strategy. In the case of the bankcard market, current trends suggest that segments of subprime and deep-subprime consumers are currently underserved, and thus I would consider the first lender to target these customers with significant resources to have ‘first-mover’ characteristics. The second-mover to a market can also have certain advantages: the second-mover can review and assess the decisions of the first-mover and develops a strategy to take advantage of opportunities not seized by the first-mover. As well, it can learn from the mistakes of the first-mover and respond, without having to incur the cost of experiential learning and possessing superior market intelligence. So, being a first-mover and second-mover can each have its advantages and pitfalls. In my next contribution, I’ll address these issues as they pertain to lenders considering their loan origination strategies for the bankcard market. (1) http://www.marketingterms.com/dictionary/first_mover_advtanage  

By: Kari Michel Most lenders use a credit scoring model in their decision process for opening new accounts; however, between 35 and 50 million adults in the US may be considered unscoreable with traditional credit scoring models. That is equivalent to 18-to-25 percent of the adult population. Due to recent market conditions and shrinking qualified candidates, lenders have placed a renewed interest in assessing the risk of this under served population.  Unscoreable consumers could be a pocket of missed opportunity for many lenders. To assess these consumers, lenders must have the ability to better distinguish between consumers with a clear track record of unfavorable credit behaviors versus those that are just beginning to develop their credit history and credit risk models. Unscoreable consumers can be divided into three populations: • Infrequent credit users:  Consumers who have not been active on their accounts for the past six months, and who prefer to use non-traditional credit tools for their financial needs. • New entrants:  Consumers who do not have at least one account with more than six months of activity; including young adults just entering the workforce, recently divorced or widowed individuals with little or no credit history in their name, newly arrived immigrants, or people who avoid the traditional system by choice. • Thin file consumers:  Consumers who have less than three accounts and rarely utilize traditional credit and likely prefer using alternative credit tools and credit score trends. A study done by VantageScore® Solutions, LLC shows that a large percentage of the unscoreable population can be scored with the VantageScore® credit score* and a portion of these are credit-worthy (defined as the population of consumers who have a cumulative likelihood to become 90 days or more delinquent is less than 5 percent).  The following is a high-level summary of the findings for consumers who had at least one trade: Lenders can review their credit decisioning process to determine if they have the tools in place to assess the risk of those unscoreable consumers.  As with this population there is an opportunity for portfolio expansion as demonstrated by the VantageScore® study. *The VantageScore® credit score model is a generic credit scoring model introduced to meet the market demands for a highly predictive consumer score. Developed as a joint venture among the three major credit reporting companies (CRCs) – Equifax, Experian and TransUnion.