Tag: real estate

No one can deny that the mortgage and real estate industries have been uniquely affected by COVID-19. Social distancing mandates have hindered open house formats and schedules. Meanwhile, historically low-interest rates, pent-up demand and low housing inventory created a frenzied sellers’ market with multiple offers, usually over-asking. Added to this are the increased scrutiny of how much borrowers will qualify and get approved for with tightened investor guidelines, and the need to verify continued employment to ensure a buyer maintains qualifying status through closing. As someone who’s spent more than 15 years in the industry and worked on all sides of the transaction (as a realtor and for direct lenders), I’ve lived through the efforts to revamp and digitize the process. However, it wasn’t until recently that I purchased my first home and experienced the mortgage process as a consumer. And it was clear that, for most lenders, the pandemic has only served to shine a light on a still somewhat fragmented mortgage process and clunky consumer experience. Here are three key components missing from a truly modernized mortgage experience: Operational efficiency Knowing that the industry had made moves toward a digital mortgage process, I hoped for a more streamlined and seamless flow of documents, loan deliverables and communication with the lender. However, the process I experienced was more manual than expected and disjointed at times. Looking at a purchase transaction from end to end, there are at least nine parties involved: buyer, seller, realtors, lender, home inspectors/inspection vendors, appraiser, escrow company and notary. With all those touchpoints in play, it takes a concerted effort between all parties and no unforeseen issues for a loan to be originated faster than 30 days. Meanwhile, the opposite has been happening, with the average time to close a loan increasing to 49 days since the beginning of the pandemic, per Ellie Mae’s Origination Insights Report. Faster access to fresher data can reduce the time to originate a mortgage. This saves resource hours for the lender, which equates to savings that can ultimately be passed down to the borrower. Digital adoption There are parts of the mortgage process that have been digitized, yes. However, the mortgage process still has points void of digital connectivity for it to truly be called an end-to-end digital process. The borrower is still required to track down various documents from different sources and the paperwork process still feels very “manual.” Printing, signing and scanning documents back to the lender to underwrite the loan add to the manual nature of the process. Unless the borrower always has all documents digitally organized, requirements like obtaining your W-2’s and paystubs, and continuously providing bank and brokerage statements to the lender, make for an awkward process. Modernizing the mortgage end-to-end with the right kind of data and technology reduces the number of manual processes and translates into lower costs to produce a mortgage. Turn times are being pushed out when the opposite could be happening. A streamlined, modernized approach between the lender and consumer not only saves time and money for both parties, it ultimately enables the lender to add value by providing a better consumer experience. Transparency Digital adoption and better digital end-to-end process are not the only keys to a better consumer experience; transparency is another integral part of modernizing the mortgage process. More transparency for the borrower starts with a true understanding of the amount for which one can qualify. This means when the loan is in underwriting, there needs to be a better understanding of the loan status and the ability to better anticipate and be proactive about loan conditions. Additionally, the lender can profit from gaining more transparency and visibility into a borrower’s income streams and assets for a more efficient and holistic picture of their ability to pay upfront. This allows for a more streamlined process and enables the lender to close efficiently without sacrificing quality underwriting. A multitude of factors have come into play since the beginning of the pandemic – social distancing mandates have led to breakdowns in a traditionally face-to-face process of obtaining a mortgage, highlighting areas for improvement. Can it be done faster, more seamlessly? Absolutely. In ideal situations, mortgage originators can consistently close in 30 days or less. Creating operational efficiencies through faster, fresher data can be the key for a lender to more accurately assess a borrower’s ability to pay upfront. At the same time, a digital-first approach enhances the consumer experience so they can have a frictionless, transparent mortgage process. With technology, better data, and the right kind of innovation, there can be a truly end-to-end digital process and a more informed consumer. Learn more

Time heals countless things, including credit scores. Many of the seven million people who saw their VantageScore® credit scores drop to sub-prime levels after suffering a foreclosure or short sale during the Great Recession have recovered and are back in the housing market. These Boomerang Buyers — people who foreclosed or short sold between 2007 and 2014 and have opened a new mortgage — will be an important segment of the real estate market in the coming years. According to Experian data, through June 2016 roughly 800,000 people had boomeranged, with Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Sacramento housing the most buyers. Some analysts believe more than three million Americans will become eligible for a home over the next three years. Are potential Boomerang Buyers a great opportunity to boost market share or a high risk for a portfolio? Early trends are positive. The majority of Boomerang Buyers who opened mortgages between 2011 and June 2016 are current on their debts. An Experian study revealed more than 29 percent of those who short sold have boomeranged, and just 1.5 percent are delinquent on their mortgage —falling below the national average of 2.8 percent. This group is also ahead of or even with the national average for delinquency on auto loans (1.2 percent vs. the national average of 2.2 percent), bankcards (3 percent vs. 4.3 percent) and retail (even at 2.7 percent). For those Boomerang Buyers who had foreclosed, the numbers are also strong. More than 12 percent have boomeranged, with just 3 percent delinquent on their mortgage. They also match or are below national average delinquency rates on auto loans (1.9 percent) and bankcards (4.1 percent), and have a slightly higher delinquency rate for retail (3.5 percent). Due to their positive credit behaviors, Boomerang Buyers also have higher VantageScore® credit scores than before. On average, the overall non-boomerang group’s credit score sunk during a foreclosure but went up 10 percent higher than before the foreclosure, and Boomerang Buyers rose by nearly 14 percent. For people who previously had a prime credit score, their number dropped by nearly 5 percent, while those who boomeranged returned to the score they had prior to the foreclosure. By comparison, the overall non-boomerang and boomerang group saw their credit score drop during a short sale and increase more than 11 percent from before the short sale. For people who previously had prime credit, they dropped 2 percent while those who boomeranged were almost flat to where they were before the short sale. Another part of the equation is the stabilized housing market and relatively low loan-to-value (LTV) limits that lenders have maintained. In the past, borrowers most often strategically defaulted on their mortgages when their LTV ratios were well over 100 percent. So as long as lenders maintain relatively low LTV limits and the housing market remains strong, strategic default is unlikely to re-emerge as a risk.

According to the latest Experian-Oliver Wyman Market Intelligence Report, home equity line of credit (HELOC) originations warmed up significantly heading into summer.

To learn the status of Americans' current credit card spending, Credit.com recently compiled a list of the states with the highest average bankcard balance per consumer in the third quarter of 2012. While several Northeastern states dominated the list, Alaska took first place, with an average bankcard balance per consumer of $5,572. On the other end of the spectrum, North Dakota and Iowa had the lowest bankcard balances, at $3,595 and $3,624, respectively.

In my last two posts on bankcard and auto originations, I provided evidence as to why lenders have reason to feel optimistic about their growth prospects in 2012.  With real estate lending however, the recovery, or lack thereof looks like it may continue to struggle throughout the year. At first glance, it would appear that the stars have aligned for a real estate turnaround.  Interest rates are at or near all-time lows, housing prices are at post-bubble lows and people are going back to work with the unemployment rate at a 3-year low just above 8%. However, mortgage originations and HELOC limits were at $327B and $20B for Q3 2011, respectively.  Admittedly not all-time quarterly lows, but well off levels of just a couple years ago.  And according to the Mortgage Bankers Association, 65% of the mortgage volume was from refinance activity. So why the lull in real estate originations?  Ironically, the same reasons I just mentioned that should drive a recovery. Low interest rates – That is, for those that qualify.  The most creditworthy, VantageScore® credit score A and B consumers made up nearly 77% of the $327B mortgage volume and 87% of the $20B HELOC volume in Q3 2011.  While continuing to clean up their portfolios, lenders are adjusting their risk exposure accordingly. Housing prices at multi-year lows - According to the S&P Case Shiller index, housing prices were 4% lower at the end of 2011 when compared to the end of 2010 and at the lowest level since the real estate bubble.  Previous to this report, many thought housing prices had stabilized, but the excess inventory of distressed properties continues to drive down prices, keeping potential buyers on the sidelines. Unemployment rate at 3-year low – Sure, 8.3% sounds good now when you consider we were near 10% throughout 2010.  But this is a far cry from the 4-5% rate we experienced just five years ago.   Many consumers continue to struggle, affecting their ability to make good on their debt obligations, including their mortgage (see “Housing prices at multi-year lows” above), in turn affecting their credit status (see “Low interest rates” above)… you get the picture. Ironic or not, the good news is that these forces will be the same ones to drive the turnaround in real estate originations.  Interest rates are projected to remain low for the foreseeable future, foreclosures and distressed inventory will eventually clear out and the unemployment rate is headed in the right direction.  The only missing ingredient to make these variables transform from the hurdle to the growth factor is time.

With the raising of the U.S. debt ceiling and its recent ramifications consuming the headlines over the past month, I began to wonder what would happen if the general credit consumer had made a similar argument to their credit lender. Something along the lines of, “Can you please increase my credit line (although I am maxed out)? I promise to reduce my spending in the future!” While novel, probably not possible. In fact, just the opposite typically occurs when an individual begins to borrow up to their personal “debt ceiling.” When the amount of credit an individual utilizes to what is available to them increases above a certain percentage, it can adversely affect their credit score, in turn affecting their ability to secure additional credit. This percentage, known as the utility rate is one of several factors that are considered as part of an individual’s credit score calculation. For example, the utilization rate makes up approximately 23% of an individual’s calculated VantageScore® credit score. The good news is that consumers as a whole have been reducing their utilization rate on revolving credit products such as credit cards and home equity lines (HELOCs) to the lowest levels in over two years. Bankcard and HELOC utilization is down to 20.3% and 49.8%, respectively according to the Q2 2011 Experian – Oliver Wyman Market Intelligence Reports. In addition to lowering their utilization rate, consumers are also doing a better job of managing their current debt, resulting in multi-year lows for delinquency rates as mentioned in my previous blog post. By lowering their utilization and delinquency rates, consumers are viewed as less of a credit risk and become more attractive to lenders for offering new products and increasing credit limits. Perhaps the government could learn a lesson or two from today’s credit consumer.

By: Kari Michel The topic of strategic default has been a hot topic for the media as far back as 2009 and continues as this problem won’t really go away until home prices climb and stay there. Terry Stockman (not his real name) earns a handsome income, maintains a high credit score and owns several residential properties. They include the Southern California home where he has lived since 2007. Terry is now angling to buy the foreclosed home across the street. What’s so unusual about this? Terry hasn’t made a mortgage payment on his own home for more than six months. With prices now at 2003 levels, his house is worth only about one-half of what he paid for it. Although he isn’t paying his mortgage loan, Terry is current with his other debt payments.   Terry is a strategic defaulter — and he isn’t alone. By the end of 2008, a record  1 in 5 mortgages at least 60 days past due was a strategic default. Since 2008, strategic defaults have fallen below that percentage in every quarter through the second quarter of 2010, the most recent quarter for which figures are available. However, the percentages are still high: 16% in the last quarter of 2009 and 17% in the second quarter of last year. Get more details off of our 2011 Strategic Default Report What does this mean for lenders? Mortgage lenders need to be able to identify strategic defaulters in order to best employ their resources and set different strategies for consumers who have defaulted on their loans. Specifically designed indicators help lenders identify suspected strategic default behavior as early as possible and can be used to prioritize account management or collections workflow queues for better treatment strategies. They also can be used in prospecting and account acquisition strategies to better understand payment behavior prior to extending an offer. Here is a white paper I thought you might find helpful.

With the issue of delayed bank foreclosures at the top of the evening news, I wanted to provide a different perspective on the issue and highlight what I think are some very important, yet often underestimated risks hidden within this issue. For many homeowners, the process of becoming delinquent and eventually going into default is actually a cash-flow positive experience. The process offers these borrowers temporary “free rent,” whereby a major previous monthly commitment is no longer a monthly obligation, freeing up cash for other purposes, including paying other bills. For those consumers who are managing cash flow issues each month, the lack of a mortgage commitment immediately allows them to meet other commitments more easily - making payments on credit cards and car loans that may have previously also become delinquent. From the perspective of a credit card or auto lender, the extended foreclosure process is a short-term positive – it allows a borrower who had previously struggled to remain current to now pay on time and in the short-run, contributes to portfolio health. Although these lenders will experience an improvement in delinquency rates, the reality is that the credit risk is simply dormant. At some point, the consumer’s mortgage will go into foreclosure, and which point the consumer will again be under pressure to continue meeting their obligations. The hidden and significant risk management issue is the misinterpretation of improved delinquency rates. Halting foreclosures means that an accumulating number of consumers are going to enter into this delayed stage of ‘free rent’, without any immediate prospect of having to make a rent or mortgage payment in the near future. In fact, according to Bank of America, “the average foreclosed borrower has not made a payment in 18 months”. This extended period of foreclosure delay will naturally result in a larger number of consumers being able to meet their non-mortgage obligations – but only while their free-rent status exists. A lender who has an interest in the “free rent” consumer is actually sitting on a time-bomb. When foreclosures stop or slow to a rate that is less than consumers entering it, that group will continue to grow in size - until foreclosures start again – at which point thousands of consumers will be processed and will have to start managing rent/housing payments again. Almost immediately, thousands of consumers who have had no problems meeting their obligations will have to start making decisions about which to pay and which not to pay. So, this buildup of rent-free mortgage holders presents a serious risk management issue to non-mortgage lenders that must be addressed. Lenders who have a relationship with a consumer who is delinquent on their mortgage may be easily fooled into thinking that they are not exposed to the same credit risk as mortgage lenders, but I think that these lenders will quickly find that consumers who have lived rent-free for over a year will have a very difficult time managing this transition, and if not diligent, credit card issuers and automotive lenders may find themselves in trouble. _____________________ http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2010/10/08/15629836.html

US interest rates are at historically low levels, and while many Americans are taking advantage of the low interest rates and refinancing their mortgages, a great deal more are struggling to find jobs,  and unable to take advantage of the rate- friendly lending environment.  This market however, continues to be complex as lenders try to competitively price products while balancing dynamic consumer risk levels, multiple product options and minimize the cost of acquisition. Due to this, lenders need to implement advanced risk-based pricing strategies that will balance the uncertain risk profiles of consumers while closely monitoring long-term profitability as re-pricing may not be an option given recent regulatory guidelines. Risk-based pricing has been a hot topic recently with the Credit Card Act and Risk-Based Pricing Rule regulation and pending deadline. For lenders who have not performed a new applicant scorecard validation or detailed portfolio analysis in the last few years now is the time to review pricing strategies and portfolio mix. This analysis will aid in maintaining an acceptable risk level as the portfolio evolves with new consumers and risk tiers  while ensuring short and long-term profitability and on-going regulatory compliance. At its core, risk-based pricing is a methodology that is used to determine the what interest rate should be charged to a consumer based on the inherent risk and profitability present within a defined pricing tier. By utilizing risk-based pricing, organizations can ensure the overall portfolio is profitable while providing competitive rates to each unique portfolio segment. Consistent review and strategy modification is crucial to success in today’s lending environment. Competition for the lowest risk consumers will continue to increase as qualified candidate pools shrink given the slow economic recovery.  By reviewing your portfolio on a regular basis and monitoring portfolio pricing strategies closely an organization can achieve portfolio growth and revenue objectives while monitoring population stability, portfolio performance and future losses.

By: Staci Baker As more people have become underwater on their mortgage, the decision to stay or not stay in their home has evolved to consider a number of influences that impact consumer credit decisions.  Research is revealing that much of an individual’s decision to meet his credit obligations is based on his trust in the economy, moral obligation, and his attitude about delinquency and the effect it will have on his credit score. Recent findings suggest that moral obligation keeps the majority of homeowners from walking away from their homes.  According to the 2009 Fannie Mae National Housing Survey (i) – “Nearly nine in ten Americans (88%), including seven in ten who are delinquent on their own mortgages, do not believe it is acceptable for people to stop making payments on an underwater mortgage, while 8% believe it is acceptable.”  It appears that there is a sense of owning up to one’s responsibilities; having signed a contract and the presumed stigma of walking away from that obligation. Maintaining strong creditworthiness by continuing to make payments on an underwater mortgage is motivation to sustain mortgage payments.  “Approximately 74% of homeowners believe it is very important to maintain good credit and this can be a factor in encouraging them not to walk away (ii).”  Once a homeowner defaults on their mortgage, their credit score can drop 150 to 250 points (iii), and the cost of credit in the future becomes much higher via increased interest rates once credit scores trend down. Although consumers expect to keep investing in the housing market (70% said buying a home continues to be one of the safest investments available (iv)) they will surely continue optimizing decisions that consider both the moral and credit implications of their decisions. i     December, 2009, Fannie Mae National Housing Survey ii  4/30/10, Financial Trust Index at 23% While Strategic Defaults Continue to Rise, The Chicago Booth/Kellogg School Financial Trust Index iii  http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/mortgage-default-credit-scores-1270.php iv  December, 2009, Fannie Mae National Housing Survey    

Since 2007, when the housing and credit crises started to unfold, we’ve seen unemployment rates continue to rise (9.7% in March 2010 *)  with very few indicators that they will return to levels that indicate a healthy economy any time soon. I’ve also found myself reading about the hardship and challenge that people are facing in today’s economy, and the question of creditworthiness keeps coming into my mind, especially as it relates to employment, or the lack thereof, by a consumer. Specifically, I can’t help but sense that there is a segment of the unemployed that will soon possess a better risk profile than someone who has remained employed throughout this crisis. In times of consistent economic performance, the static state does not create the broad range of unique circumstances that comes when sharp growth or decline occurs. For instance, the occurrence of strategic default is one circumstance where the capacity to pay has not been harmed, but the borrower defaults on the commitment anyway. Strategic defaults are rare in a stable market. In contrast, many unemployed individuals who have encountered unfortunate circumstances and are now out of work may have repayment issues today, but do possess highly desirable character traits (willingness to pay) that enhance their long-term desirability as a borrower. Although the use of credit score trends, credit risk modeling and credit attributes are essential in assessing the risk within these different borrowers, I think new risk models and lending policies will need to adjust to account for the growing number of individuals who might be exceptions to current policies. Will character start to account for more than a steady job? Perhaps. This change in lending policy, may in turn, allow lenders to uncover new and untapped opportunities for growth in segments they wouldn’t traditionally serve. *  Source: US Department of Labor. http://www.bls.gov/bls/unemployment.htm

A recent article in the Boston Globe talked about the lack of incentive for banks to perform wide-scale real estate loan modifications due to the lack of profitability for lenders in the current government-led program structure. The article cited a recent study by the Boston Federal Reserve that noted up to 45 percent of borrowers who receive loan modifications end up in arrears again afterwards. On the other hand, around 30 percent of borrowers cured without any external support from lenders - leading them to believe that the cost and effort required modifying delinquent loans is not a profitable or not required proposition. Adding to this, one of the study’s authors was quoted as saying “a lot of people you give assistance to would default either way or won’t default either way.” The problem that lenders face is that although they have the knowledge that certain borrowers are prone to re-default, or cure without much assistance – there has been little information available to distinguish these consumers from each other.  Segmenting these customers is the key to creating a profitable process for loan modifications, since identification of the consumer in advance will allow lenders to treat each borrower in the most efficient and profitable manner. In considering possible solutions, the opportunity exists to leverage the power of credit data, and credit attributes to create models that can profile the behaviors that lenders need to isolate. Although the rapid changes in the economy have left many lenders without a precedent behavior in which to model, the recent trend of consumers that re-default is beginning to provide lenders with correlated credit attributes to include in their models. Credit attributes were used in a recent study on strategic defaulters by the Experian-Oliver Wyman Market Intelligence Reports, and these attributes created defined segments that can assist lenders with implementing profitable loan modification policies and decisioning strategies.  

In my previous two blogs, I introduced the definition of strategic default and compared and contrasted the population to other types of consumers with mortgage delinquency.  I also reviewed a few key characteristics that distinguish strategic defaulters as a distinct population. Although I’ve mentioned that segmenting this group is important, I would like to specifically discuss the value of segmentation as it applies to loan modification programs and the selection of candidates for modification. How should loan modification strategies be differentiated based on this population? By definition, strategic defaulters are more likely to take advantage of loan modification programs. They are committed to making the most personally-lucrative financial decisions, so the opportunity to have their loan modified - extending their ‘free’ occupancy – can be highly appealing.  Given the adverse selection issue at play with these consumers, lenders need to design loan modification programs that limit abuse and essentially screen-out strategic defaulters from the population. The objective of lenders when creating loan modification programs should be to identify consumers who show the characteristics of cash-flow managers within our study. These consumers often show similar signs of distress as the strategic defaulters, but differentiate themselves by exhibiting a willingness to pay that the strategic defaulter, by definition, does not. So, how can a lender make this identification? Although these groups share similar characteristics at times, it is recommended that lenders reconsider their loan modification decisioning algorithms, and modify their loan modification offers to screen out strategic defaulters.  In fact, they could even develop programs such as equity-sharing arrangements whereby the strategic defaulter could be persuaded to remain committed to the mortgage.  In the end, strategic defaulters will not self-identify by showing lower credit score trends, by being a bank credit risk, or having previous bankruptcy scores, so lenders must create processes to identify them among their peers. For more detailed analyses, lenders could also extend the Experian-Oliver Wyman study further, and integrate additional attributes such as current LTV, product type, etc. to expand their segment and identify strategic defaulters within their individual portfolios.    

In my last blog, I discussed the presence of strategic defaulters and outlined the definitions used to identify these consumers, as well as other pools of consumers within the mortgage population that are currently showing some measure of mortgage repayment distress. In this section, I will focus on the characteristics of strategic defaulters, drilling deeper into the details behind the population and learning how one might begin to recognize them within that population. What characteristics differentiate strategic defaulters? Early in the mortgage delinquency stage, mortgage defaulters and cash flow managers look quite similar – both are delinquent on their mortgage, but are not going bad on any other trades. Despite their similarities, it is important to segment these groups, since mortgage defaulters are far more likely to charge-off and far less likely to cure than cash flow managers. So, given the need to distinguish between these two segments, here are a few key measures that can be used to define each population. Origination VantageScore® credit score • Despite lower overall default rates, prime and super-prime consumers are more likely to be strategic defaulters  Origination Mortgage Balance • Consumers with higher mortgage balances at origination are more likely to be strategic defaulters, we conclude this is a result of being further underwater on their real estate property than lower-balance consumers Number of Mortgages • Consumers with multiple first mortgages show higher incidence of strategic default.  This trend represents consumers with investment properties making strategic repayment decisions on investments (although the majority of defaults still occur on first mortgages where the consumer has only one first mortgage) Home Equity Line Performance • Strategic defaulters are more likely to remain current on Home Equity Lines until mortgage delinquency occurs, potentially a result of drawing down the HELOC line as much as possible before becoming delinquent on the mortgage Clearly, there are several attributes that identify strategic defaulters and can assist in differentiating them from cash flow managers. The ability to distinguish between these two populations is extremely valuable when considering its usefulness in the application of account management and collections management, improving collections, and loan modification, which is my next topic. Source: Experian-Oliver Wyman Market Intelligence Reports; Understanding strategic default in mortgage topical study/webinar, August 2009.

For the past couple years, the deterioration of the real estate market and the economy as a whole has been widely reported as a national and international crisis. There are several significant events that have contributed to this situation, such as, 401k plans have fallen, homeowners have simply abandoned their now under-valued properties, and the federal government has raced to save the banking and automotive sectors. While the perspective of most is that this is a national decline, this is clearly a situation where the real story is in the details. A closer look reveals that while there are places that have experienced serious real estate and employment issues (California, Florida, Michigan, etc.), there are also areas (Texas) that did not experience the same deterioration in the same manner. Flash forward to November, 2009 – with signs of recovery seemingly beginning to appear on the horizon – there appears to be a great deal of variability between areas that seem poised for recovery and those that are continuing down the slope of decline. Interestingly though, this time the list of usual suspects is changing. In a recent article posted to CNN.com, Julianne Pepitone observes that many cities that were tops in foreclosure a year ago have since shown stabilization, while at the same time, other cities have regressed. A related article outlines a growing list of cities that, not long ago, considered themselves immune from the problems being experienced in other parts of the country. Previous economic success stories are now being identified as economic laggards and experiencing the same pains, but only a year or two later. So – is there a lesson to be taken from this? From a business intelligence perspective, the lesson is generalized reporting information and forecasting capabilities are not going to be successful in managing risk. Risk management and forecasting techniques will need to be developed around specific macro- and micro-economic changes.  They will also need to incorporate a number of economic scenarios to properly reflect the range of possible future outcomes about risk management and risk management solutions. Moving forward, it will be vital to understand the differences in unemployment between Dallas and Houston and between regions that rely on automotive manufacturing and those with hi-tech jobs. These differences will directly impact the performance of lenders’ specific footprints, as this year’s “Best Place to Live” according to Money.CNN.com can quickly become next year’s foreclosure capital. ihttp://money.cnn.com/2009/10/28/real_estate/foreclosures_worst_cities/index.htm?postversion=2009102811 iihttp://money.cnn.com/galleries/2009/real_estate/0910/gallery.foreclosures_worst_cities/2.html